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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
ERIC P. SWENSON, 
Appellant, 
v* 
LYLE R. ANDERSON, 
Appellee* 
Case No* 20020227-SC 
APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF 
RESPONSE TO FACTUAL STATEMENTS 
The only factual findings came from affidavits about fees and 
costs. No evidentiary hearings were held and no factual findings 
were made regarding the substantive elements of the alleged 
violations of Rules ll(b)(l)-(3). The district court awarded 
sanctions based solely on its construction and interpretation of 
the record* Judge Anderson argues that the district court's 
construction and interpretation of the pleadings and other 
documents in the record are actually findings of fact that should 
be marshalled by Appellant. The marshalling requirement does not 
apply to at least two provisions of Rule 11 because neither require 
factual findings since they involve only questions of law. See 
Rule 11(b)(2) (viability of legal theories and claims) and Rule 
11(b)(3) (sufficiency of facts alleged to support plaintiffs legal 
theory and claims). The other provision, Rule 11(b)(1), also does 
not require use of the marshalling argument because the district 
court made its conclusions based solely on its construction and 
interpretation of the record* This is a question of law that is 
reviewed de novo by this Court. See argument, infra. 
INTRODUCTION 
The district court's emphasis in finding a violation of Rule 
11 and imposing sanctions was on the first appeal in this case. 
Judge Anderson emphasizes this aspect of the case and also argues 
that the second appeal merits sanctions and an award of fees. 
Accordingly, Appellant discusses these two appeals separately and 
then addresses each subsection of Rule 11(b). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT ONE 
Neither appeal justifies sanctions. 
1. The First Appeal. 
a. There was no Rule 11 violation. Nor is the appeal 
frivolous• 
Judge Anderson argues that the first app€*al is frivolous or a 
violation of Rule 11 and that sanctions were* appropriate. This 
ignores what the first appeal was all about. Judge Roth found no 
Rule 11 violation because counsel acted in good faith. This ruling 
was upheld by this Court. Crank v. Utah Judicial Council, 20 P.3d 
307, 316, ? 32 (Utah 2001) (Crank I). Counsel had every right to 
defend this ruling when Judge Anderson appealed the trial court's 
denial of sanctions. Counsel was successful in that this Court 
upheld the finding of the district court that Counsel acted in good 
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faitl i» I d. Counsel was thus the preva i II ing party on th i s gues Ibi 01 1 
C ou n s e ] ' s d efense o f I: h :i s :i s s u e :i n t: h e f :i r s t app e a 1 c a n n o t be 
ter med f r:i vo] c -\ is • rha t this was ignored by the district court is 
reversible error. 
Regardincr counsel's taking of an appeal over Judge Anderson's 
1 :i abi ] :i I::],. ; :: i i m e o 1 : Ji i n 111 • i • 1 11 < i • '. 1 1 i * 1 11 I I / \ 1i M • 11men t ed tha L f b e 
c l a i m s d i e s i b l o oj r e a s o n a b l y 1i i)iiiiibl t , w«iw c a r e f u l l y 
r e s e a r c h e d
 P -Ived legal theories used by other, state and federal 
c 11: t : s , . I  11 I I " IOI • I i 111 I l e i w i i i i " «11 ( \ \ 11»u • 111 i 11111 m > 111 * I 11111 mi mi * » r e -i o 11 > 11»1 e 
lawyer would employ. See Appellant's Brief, Pages 27-lb™ l'he fact 
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r e q u i r e m e n t s of A p p e l l a t e Mule J J andl Huh II a r e synonymous . To 
t h e c o n t r a r y r I he \wo rules lot only have different elements but 
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in i he district com I iiml Mule II lot u i elationis mi I he appellate 
level. See Appellant/s Brief, Pages 9 12, 
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satisfies the rule's objective of deterrence because the sanctions 
amount to a deterrence. Deterrence was not the focus of the 
district court's ruling because the purpose was to partially 
compensate the judge's lawyers. This cannot be the primary purpose 
for administering Rule 11 in a particular case. See Appellant's 
Brief, Pages 12-13. 
b. The district court failed to properly resolve disputed 
issues of fact regarding fees. 
The trial court failed to properly resolve issues of fact in 
awarding fees, particularly in regards to the hourly rate of the 
judge's lawyers. Appellant's Brief, Pages 13-14. The judge replies 
that counsel waived this objection by not requesting a hearing. 
But counsel provided opposing affidavits and statements which 
raised the factual issue, e.g., R. 1957-1963, and further asked the 
Court to hold a hearing. Id. Although Judge Anderson argues that 
these affidavits and declarations were alone sufficient as a basis 
for resolving the issue, they did nothing more than establish that 
there were disputed facts. Nothing in the record proves that 
counsel knowingly waived the right to a hearing to resolve 
contested factual issues and Judge Anderson makes no reference to 
any document in the record or identify any hearing in which such an 
event is alleged to have occurred on the record. A waiver cannot 
be presumed from a silent record. Cf., Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 
238, 242-243 (1969). 
4 
2. The Second _ appeal • 
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emphasized the awar d covered appeal and pout -appeal wm Ik IN 'llli'l, 
Judge Anderson chose not tc • challenge I ii i i ru l ing Willi >t c ross 
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c o u n t ' s t eduction ot \v\ JI See Stilt e i "MIIIIII, 'I I II1 I'II I i I IVi-
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and cannot use adversary's appeal to gain a greater benefit than 
that granted below). 
Judge Anderson argues that he should not be required to 
shoulder the expense of defending the second appeal. However, the 
judge's interest should give way to counsel's right to defend 
himself when sanctions are imposed. The controversy at this point 
is between counsel and the district court and its ruling. The 
right of defense is elemental to fundamental fairness. Counsel 
should not have his right to appeal chilled by the possibility of 
further sanctions. See Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corporation, 496 
U.S. 384, 408-409 (1990). 
POINT TWO 
There is no Rule ll(b(l) violation. 
Rule 11(b)(1) pertains only to counsel's alleged improper 
purpose in bringing the action against Judge Anderson. For a 
variety of sound reasons, counsel's alleged improper purpose is not 
a proper basis for sanctions. See Appellant's Brief, Pages 18-27. 
The district court's sanctions are ostensibly based on all three 
subsections of Rule 11. However, the actual reasoning, regardless 
of which subsection of the rule is referenced, is counsel's alleged 
improper purpose and motivation. The district court primarily 
relies on this issue to both find a violation and to impose 
sanctions. The reason that using this approach constitutes error 
is that counsel's motivation has been resolved in counsel's favor. 
See Point One, supra. Reviewing the district court's conclusions 
de novo, this Court may again resolve this question in counsel's 
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tor hi.,* continued concern about the exclusion of Native American 
jurors would chill counsel's obligation to protect the class of 
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Indian jurors. Appellant's Brief, Pages 14-17. * 
Judge Anderson argues that this Court invited the district 
court to reconsider its upholding of the earlier finding of 
counsel's good faith, citing Crank I, 20 P.3d 307, 316, n.13. 
However, the language in this footnote deals only with the question 
of whether the trial court meant to include the plaintiff in its 
ruling or limited its decision to counsel. It provides no 
authority for the district court to reconsider this court's ruling 
that counsel acted in good faith. Id. at 316, 15 32-33. Moreover, 
to construe this footnote to allow the district court to apply 
counsel's alleged improper purpose to a violation of every 
subsection of the rule for conduct for which he has been exonerated 
would flatly contradict this Court's express instructions that on 
remand only the issues under Rule 11(b)(2) and 11(b)(3) should be 
considered. Id. at 316, 5 34; 319, 5 44. 
POINT THREE 
There is no Rule 11(b)(2) violation. 
Rule 11(b)(2) pertains to the legal viability of the claims 
made against Judge Anderson. Appellant has made an extensive and 
thorough briefing of what the claims against the judge were, as 
well as identifying the legal theories and research which formed 
1
 Since the filing of Appellant's Brief, there is further 
evidence that the Utah Judicial Council, with complicity from Judge 
Anderson, continues to violate the Consent Agreement and Decree. 
In a recent report, the Council admits that the numbers of Native 
Americans on recent jury lists, lists which exceeded the 
Agreement's standards, were deliberately reduced to a level below 
the Agreement's standards. See Utah Judicial Council's Second 
Report To The Court, R. 2100-2104, particularly R. 2102-2103. 
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the basis for the claims. A reasonable attorney would have found 
these claims to be plausible. Appellant/s Brief, Pages 27-36. 
The district court found a violation of Rule 11(b)(2) because 
counsel never argued that the court should extend, modify or 
reverse the law or establish new law and that counsel only 
contended that existing law warranted the relief sought. R. 2067. 
The Court also made comment that existing law did not warrant the 
relief sought. Jji. This decision involves a construction of the 
pleadings and other materials in the case record. It is a ruling 
on a question of law that this Court may review de novo without 
giving deference to the district court.2 
The district court is wrong because counsel in fact based his 
claims on the plain meaning of the Agreement of the Parties and 
Consent Decree; used Utah statutory and procedural rules; and based 
his claim against Judge Anderson as a non-party for aiding and 
abetting a party who is violating a court order on a legal theory 
that has been long used in other jurisdictions. See Appellant's 
Brief, Pages 27-36. No Rule 11 violation occurred because counsel 
made a reasonable inquiry* Barnard v. Utah State Bar, 857 P.2d 
917, 920-921 (Utah 1993). The district court's ruling does not 
address these points. Neither does Judge Anderson's response. The 
district court's focus was on whether the relief sought was 
warranted under existing law, but failed to give consideration to 
2
 Judge Anderson's marshalling argument seems to encompass 
Rule 11(b)(2) issues. Appellee's Brief, Pages 9-11. However, 
marshalling of the facts does not apply to the evaluation of the 
elements of a legal theory or cause of action. 
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all of plaintiffs legal theories. 
It is a proper construction of plaintiffs pleadings that 
counsel contended that the claims, supported by reasonable inquiry 
and research, including case law, are in fact existing law, or, if 
not, can be taken as an argument that they should be the law in 
Utah. Significantly, this Court acknowledged the legal viability 
of claims against non parties. Crank I, 20 P. 3d 307, 314, 11 24-25. 
This means that this Court found at least one of plaintiff's claims 
had a basis in existing Utah law. See also Appellant's Brief, 
Pages 34-35. Another claim not specifically addressed by this 
Court, the aiding and abetting claim, had support from case law 
from other jurisdictions. In view of these factors, the district 
court's Rule 11 sanctions was inappropriate. 
The district court also found a Rule 11(b)(2) violation in 
counsel's continued action against the judge after he had been 
dismissed from the case, i.e., by the taking of the first appeal. 
R. 2067. The district court construed the first appeal as 
establishing counsel's improper motive, using this in the same way 
that it did in imposing sanctions under Rule 11(b)(1). H * at 2067-
2068. Since Rule 11(b)(2) pertains only to legal claims and 
issues, and their basis in the law, and does not, by its plain 
meaning, pertain to conduct or motive, using this provision as a 
basis for sanctions was error. To the extent that the district 
court's sanctions for violating this subsection of the rule are 
based on counsel's alleged improper purpose, the court erred. 
10 
POINT FOUR 
There is no Rule 11(b)(3) violation. 
Rule 11(b)(3) pertains only to the question of the sufficiency 
of the factual allegations underlying plaintiff's causes of action 
and legal theories. Judge Anderson claims that Appellant failed to 
marshall the evidence regarding the district court's finding that 
Rule 11(b)(3) was violated. No findings were made by the district 
court about facts that plaintiff alleged in support of each legal 
theories and claims. Rather, the district court simply held that, 
based solely on the record and its interpretation of Crank I, that 
there were no facts alleged at all. R. 2068. Judge Anderson's 
response simply relies on this finding and does not attempt to 
discuss or analyze plaintiff's underlying factual allegations. 
There were considerable facts that demonstrate that plaintiff's 
legal theories were properly factually based. Appellant's Brief, 
Pages 36-48. 
Judge Anderson asserts that this Court in Crank I held that 
there were insufficient facts alleged and that this justifies 
sanctions. This mirrors the approach used by the district court. 
This Court said in regards to some claims that were made, and even 
some that plaintiff never made at all, that sworn facts were not 
provided. Crank I, 20 P.3d 307, 325, f 29; see also Appellant's 
Brief, Pages 38-39. This Court said nothing about the factual 
allegations supporting plaintiff's primary claim that the judge 
aided and abetted a party that was violating a court order. Nor 
did this Court suggest that factual claims could be a basis for 
11 
sanctions. As for the facts supporting the aiding and abetting 
claim, there were a lot of them alleged. See Appellants7 Brief, 
Pages 40-47. The district court did not acknowledge nor did it 
address the sufficiency of these factual allegations in his ruling 
imposing sanctions. R. 2068. The district court erred in imposing 
sanctions under this provision of Rule 11. 
Judge Anderson argues that Crank J's finding about the facts 
should have been challenged by a petition for rehearing rather than 
waiting to address the question on remand. The failure to do so 
constitutes a waiver. No case law or other ciuthority is presented 
in support of this contention. What was said by this Court about 
factual allegations on a variety of issues, but not in regards to 
plaintiff's primary claim, does not bear on the question of whether 
counsel complied with Rule 11 standards by alleging adequate facts. 
Whether a rehearing would clarify or settle questions about the 
facts is purely speculative. 
An important question which makes sanctions under this 
provision particularly inappropriate is the fact that the judge did 
not allege that Rule 11(b)(3) had been violated when he first 
brought his Rule 11 before Judge Roth. Challenging the facts at 
the outset was required as a matter of fairness and due process 
under Rule 11(c) in order to provide counsel a period of time in 
which he had safe harbor to cure the alleged problem without fear 
of sanctions. 
The district court in imposing sanctions under Rule 11(b)(3) 
did not address this problem with notice and did not address the 
12 
defense which obviously comes into play as a result. Judge 
Anderson does not say why he did not timely raise a question about 
the facts, other than to say he elected to take some other 
approach. Nor does he explain why, despite his failure to provide 
the notice required under the rule, this provision can be a basis 
for sanctions. Certainly, there is no case law or other authority 
that would support such a process. The failure to provide notice 
at the outset flaws any sanctions awarded under this provision of 
the rule. This Court should therefore reverse and set aside 
sanctions imposed on this basis. Appellant's Brief, Pages 36-39* 
CONCLUSION 
This Court should reverse the judgment and order of the 
district court and remand the matter to the district court for a 
dismissal of all claims against Attorney Swenson. No sanctions and 
fees should be imposed for any of counsel,s actions in this case. 
Further, Judge Anderson should not be awarded fees and costs for 
this appeal. 
Dated this 9th day of September^ 2002^ ^ 
Eric P. Swenson 
Appellant 
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Eric P. Swenson, Appellant, hereby certifies that he did mail 
two true and correct copies of the foregoing Reply Brief to the 
attorneys for Appellee, as follows: to the attorneys for Judge 
Anderson, Robert L. Anderson and Daniel G. Anderson, Anderson and 
Anderson, P.O. Box 275, M^ti,cello^Jtah7~8^4535f this 9th day of 
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Eric P. Swenson 
Appellant 
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